China has experienced dramatic institutional development such as the establishment of secure property rights, the enhancement of law enforcement, and the liberalization of political institutions over the last 20 years. The variation across China's provinces in the level of institutional development provides a unique opportunity to compare the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, across distinct institutional environment, but still within one country. Based on a sample of 31 Chinese provinces for the period 1998-2007, we show that stock price synchronicity is lower when there is sounder institutional development in term of property rights protection, rule of law, and political pluralism. We also find that better institutions have a more pronounced effect on stock price informativeness for firms with poor corporate governance measured by higher government ownership and lower foreign ownership. JEL Classification Numbers: G14; G15; G24; G38
Introduction
A large literature has shown that high firm-specific stock return variation or low stock price synchronicity can reflect more firm-specific information to investors, which will increase the efficiency of capital allocation and decrease the cost of capital (Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Wurgler, 2000) . Further there is a cross country literature indicating that economies with poor institutional environments have relatively high stock price synchronicity because reliable firm specific information is not readily available (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000 , Jin and Myers, 2006 , and Fernandes and Ferreira 2008 ). However, a potential drawback of these empirical studies is that firms operating in distinct legal and information environments are also affected by other country specific characteristics such as diversity in historical experiences. This complicates the task of isolating the effect of the institutions that provide investor protection from the effects of other country characteristics. In our study, we overcome this obstacle by holding constant national characteristics and allowing investor protection provided by better institutions to vary by focusing on the effect of province-level institutional characteristics such as property rights protection and the rule of law on firm-specific return variation within a single country -China.
More importantly, the exiting literature only focuses on the effects of investor protection from the perspective of legal and information environment, (e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000 , Jin and Myers, 2006 , and Fernandes and Ferreira 2008 . However, political environment is more important because politicians can change other investor protection characteristics, if they choose to do so (Pagano and Volpin, 2005) . For example, an authoritarian political party can enact a new legislation anytime and completely change the existing legal environment related to investor protection. It is especially true in emerging markets because their political environment is still evolving. In addition, political environment has a direct effect on firms' stock price synchronicity because political institutions determine economic policies. Thus, in our paper, we also try to employs variation across China's provinces in the level of political environment and examine how political pluralism influences stock price synchronicity. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that the level of informed trading and informative pricing, which is a central determinant of the level of firm-specific stock variation, is determined by the cost-benefit trade-off on information collection. Following this rationale, we reason that the poor institutional development increase the cost of information collection and reduce investors' incentives to collect private information. This reduces the information content of stock prices and increases stock price synchronicity. A priori, there are several reasons why poor institutional development could lead to less private information collection. First, in provinces that provide poor property protection for investors, the risk of expropriation by corporate insiders could make firm-specific information less valuable and informed risk arbitrage is unattractive.
Second, even good regulations regarding information disclosure are often not fully enforced when there is poor rule of law. The entrenched managers are able to withhold relevant information to cover their own self-serving behavior. 1 Third, liberal democracy is positively associated with successful economic liberalization (Zack-Williams, 2001 ). Thus, the absence of political pluralism will discourage the entry of investors from other countries or other provinces who would be willing to collect private information. Fourth, in regions with less democracy, political events, or even rumors about political events have a significant impact on the overall economy which will reduce the value of firm-specific information and increase stock price synchronicity (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) .
Rapid development over the last 20 years has both improved the development of Chinese institutions but also increased the variation among China's provinces in the level of institutional development. This provides a perfect research setting to answer our research questions. In this paper we explore the link between stock price synchronicity and province-level institutional characteristics regarding property rights protection, the rule of law and political pluralism. We use data for 31 Chinese provinces for the period 1998-2007 and show that a firm's stock price synchronicity is lower (i.e. the information content of its price is higher) when the firm is located in a province with a better environment.
In addition, the Chinese stock market has some unique features because there are both shares issued to domestic investors (A-shares) and two types of shares issued to foreign investors (B-shares that trade on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges and H-shares that are traded in Hong Kong). Our result is still robust when we use different specifications of stock price synchronicity measures that include the influence of other markets.
Also, Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that the relationship between investor protection and stock price synchronicity is different in emerging markets as compared to developed 1 For a discussion of these issues in emerging markets see Chan and Hameed (2006) , Fan and Wong (2005). countries. To see if there are any similar threshold effects within China, we divide our sample into developing provinces with below median GDP per capita and developed provinces and the regressions are estimated for these two sub samples separately. We find that our results are not driven by the differences between the sub samples.
Finally, some alternative explanations may drive our main results. For instance, it is possible that the poor provincial institutions may enhance the development of business group, industry vertical integration, and operating diversification, which further increase stock price synchronicity (Khanna and Thomas, 2009 ). To deal with these issues, we find that better institutions have a more pronounced effect on stock price informativeness for firms with poor corporate governance measured by higher government ownership and lower foreign ownership.
These results suggest that the negative relationship between institutional development and stock price synchronicity is because that the poor institutional development provides less investor protection. This increases the cost of information collection and reduces investors' incentives to collect private information. This further reduces the information content of stock prices and increases stock price synchronicity.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, as noted earlier, by using province level data from one country, we overcome the problem faced by all cross country studies regarding omitted country characteristics. Our study provides a unique focus on the effect of province-level investor protection in the single most important emerging countryChina. The measures of institutional development in China at the provincial level were first developed by Hasan, Wachtel and Zhou (2009) who relate use the data to explain difference in the growth rate across provinces. Second, in addition to the effects of property rights and law enforcement, we also examine the effect of another important aspect of institutional development, political pluralism, a measure of the strength of democracy, on stock price informativeness which has not been investigated before. Third, China has the quota system to select companies from each province for listing or raising additional equity on a stock exchange. Du and Xu (2008) demonstrate that provinces in which listed firms have more firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices were rewarded with more stock quotas in the subsequent periods.
We provide an important mechanism to improve stock price informativeness and further increase firms' access to capital market by conducting province-level legal reform.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discuses the related literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 presents our sample, measures, data sources, and reports descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical methodology and provides the primary evidence about the relationship between institutional development and stock price informativeness. Section 5 shows our robustness tests and the final section summarizes our conclusions.
Related Literature and Hypothesis development
From the 1980s, China has followed an incremental and experimental approach to reforming its centrally planned economy into a market system which has resulted in remarkably high growth rates sustained for almost three decades (Prasad and Rajan, 2006) . Rapid economic growth both demands and facilitates the development of legal institutions and the evolution of political systems (Williamson, 1996) . There are a few empirical studies of the role of institutional development in China showing, for example, that the institutional environment matters for Chinese firms' reinvestment decisions and for fostering entrepreneurship (Cull and Xu, 2005; Djankov, Qian, Roland, and Zhuravskaya, 2006 ). An important feature of the evolution of the legal environment in China is that many of the laws adopted are enacted locally following national legislation so that their implementation varies from province to province (Krug and Hendrischke, 2003) . Such variation is found for laws and regulations that ensure the protection of property rights (see, Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou, 2009 for details). Thus, there is information available to examine the effect of property rights on stock price synchronicity.
Studies with cross country data have established the importance of intellectual property rights protection for economic growth (Gould and Gruben, 1996; Park and Ginarte, 1997) .
Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou (2009) use the number of trade mark applications in Chinese provinces to proxy the awareness of property rights and show that it is related to growth rates.
The link between property right protection and the information in stock prices has been discussed in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) . They argue that poor protection for property rights could discourages informed risk arbitrage because expropriation risk will make such behavior less valuable and increase their cost of collecting firm-specific private information. The reduced informed trading will impede the capitalization of firm-specific information into stock prices and decreases firm-specific return variation. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) provide evidence that the stocks of firms in economies with poor country-level property rights have relatively high synchronicity. In our paper, we focus on the effect of province-level property right protection and our first hypothesis is that: H1: Stock price synchronicity is lower for firms in provinces with better property rights.
Another notable feature of the evolution of the modern Chinese legal system was the spread of the rule of law and, specifically, institutional structures for the enforcement of rules and the settlement of disputes. For instance, in 1995, the State Compensation Law allowed citizens to sue the state (Burns, 1999) . The functions of the Party and government in the people's congress system are separated to strengthen the rule of law (Burns, 1999) . In this process, many members of the legal profession such as lawyers and judges were rehabilitated which significantly improved the quality of law enforcement (Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou, 2009 ).
The effect of rule of law and related issues on firm-specific return variation was explored by Ball (2001) and Chan and Hameed (2006) . Even when there are adequate laws on the disclosure of corporate information, they are often not fully enforced when there is poor rule of law. Entrenched managers might find it in their interest to withhold information which increases the cost of collecting private information and leads to less firm-specific information being reflected into stock prices. The cross country study by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) related aspects of the rule of law such as an efficient judiciary to stock price synchronicity. In our study, we focus on the effect of rule of law across provinces in China and hypothesize that: H2: Stock price synchronicity is lower for firms in provinces with higher quality of law enforcement.
Besides the development of the legal system, China's leaders have long recognized the need for political reform. While China is still a largely authoritarian communist state, there have been significant movements towards political pluralism (White, 1993, Chapter 8) . For example, non-party members such as professional experts and members of minority political parties occupy approximately one third of the seats in the National People's Congress (NPC), the highest legislative body in China (Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou, 2009 ). This significantly contributes to elements of pluralism in Chinese political structures and decision making. The delegates to the NPC are elected by the provincial people's congresses and the degree of pluralism varied across provinces. Thus we will be able to examine the effect on stock price synchronicity of a more open and pluralistic political structure.
The cross country literature has shown that more democratic political environments are associated with economic growth (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2006; Borner, Brunetti, and Weder, 1995) . Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Mauro (1995) document that poor quality of political institutions is associated with substantial economic costs, especially in developing economies.
Further, the literature shows a positive association between liberal democracy and successful economic liberalization (e.g., Zack-Williams, 2001 ).
In the China context, we suggest that greater political pluralism in a province will attract investors from elsewhere who are willing to collect private information which decreases synchronicity. In regions with less democracy, political events, or even rumors about political events will dominate market-wide stock price variation and lead to more stock price synchronicity. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) linked one aspect of the country-level quality of government, an absence of corruption, to stock price synchronicity. In our paper, we focus on the effect of pluralism across provinces in China and hypothesize that: H3: Stock price synchronicity is lower for firms in provinces with more political pluralism, ceteris paribus.
Data

Sample
Our sample covers the period 1998-2007 and includes all non-financial firms in China with available stock returns data from Datastream for at least 200 trading days in a particular year.
2 Altogether, the sample includes 1012 firms and 5719 firm-year observations. Firms are 2 We begin in 1998 because the province level data on the institutional environment are not available earlier.
assigned to the geographical region where the company headquarters are located. The location of each firm's headquarters was collected by hand from the prospectus. The distribution of firms in the sample across the 31 geographical areas is shown in Panel A of Table 1.   3 Firms are dispersed almost evenly across the provinces and not concentrated in a few regions.
Measurement of stock price synchronicity
Stock price synchronicity is based on market model regressions for each firm of daily stock returns on the returns of an industry index and the market index. The Chinese market has some unique features because there are both shares issued to domestic investors (A-shares) and two types of shares issued to foreign investors (B-shares that trade on the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges and H-shares that are traded in Hong Kong).
To begin, we estimate the following market model for each stock and each year using daily return data:
( 1) where Return it denotes the daily return on A-shares for firm i and day t. IndustryReturn t is the industry return calculated as a value-weighted stock return of all other firms within the same industry as firm i (with Return it omitted); MarketReturn t is the value-weighted A-share market return for all firms; and ε it represents unspecified random factors.
Next, following the approach introduced by Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010), we estimate extended market models to account for differences among the various markets where Chinese shares are traded. For firms with only domestic A-share, the extended model is shown in equation (2a) which adds the world market returns:
WorldMarketReturn t is the world market return that is calculated using the MSCI World index for day t.
For firms with A and B-shares, we also add the value-weighted B-share market return
BShareMarketReturn t as shown in equation (2b):
And for firms with A and H-shares, we add the world market factor and the H-share market returns as shown in equation (2c):
where HShareMarketReturn t is the value-weighted Hong Kong market return. 
Measures of institutional development
We measure three aspects of province-level institutional development in China: property rights protection, rule of law and political pluralism. A major challenge in our study is that direct measures of such institutional development are not available and only imperfect proxies exist. We follow Hasan, Wachtel, and Zhou (2009) Information on the membership structures of the People's Congress in six provinces is not available and data from neighboring provinces with similar political characteristics is used as an estimate.
Other variables
The set of control variables includes various characteristics of firms and the macro environment that are known to influence synchronicity (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Gul, Kim, and Qiu, 2010) . Specifically, we include the proportion of equity held by the government and by foreign owners (GovernmentOwn and ForeignOwn) for each firm year. The government and foreign ownership data is from the NUS Business School's database of Chinese listed firms' ownership structure. We also include dummy variables for the share structure (BShare and
HShare if the firm has issued B shares and H shares respectively). Firm characteristics included are: a) the annual trading turnover (Volume) which is the total number of shares traded in a year divided by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year; b) Size, the logarithm of total assets; (c) Leverage, total liabilities divided by total assets; (d) EarningVolatility, the standard deviation of a firm's ROA for the preceding five-year period including the current year;
(e) MatketToBook, the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity; and (f) Log(IPOAge), the logarithm of the firm age since IPO. We also include two measures of industry size: (a) the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs (IndustryByNumber) and (b) the logarithm of the total assets of all firms in the industry that are in our sample (IndustryBySize). The stock turnover data are from Datastream and the firm accounting data are from the Worldscope database. Macro variables in the set of controls are (a) the annual province-level growth rate in per capita real GDP (GDPGrowth), and (b) the per capita real GDP (GDPPerCapita). The real annual per capita GDP for each province is from China Economic Information Network Database. We provide a table of data definitions in the appendix.
Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics by province are shown in Table 1 . Provinces are ranked by the values of the three institutional variables in Panels A through C. by the mean value of stock price synchronicity for the firms from the province measured by
(1). Most of the provinces with higher institutional development have low stock price synchronicity. For example, Gan'Su province has the highest stock price synchronicity.
Moreover it has the lowest value for PropertyRights and the second lowest value for RuleofLaw and PoliticalPluralism. Bei'Jing has the lowest stock price synchronicity; it has the highest value of PropertyRights and RuleofLaw and the fourth highest value of PoliticalPluralism.
The trend in synchronicity is shown in Figure 1 which plots the mean value of R
2
(1) of Chinese firms in each year. Synchronicity is clearly decreasing over our sample period which is consistent with the evidence in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) . Generally, stock price synchronicity decreases as financial markets develop.
Summary statistics for the whole sample are shown in Table 2 Table 2 also shows that, on average, the state shareholder holds 31.0 percent of shares outstanding and the foreign shareholders hold 6.7 percent of shares outstanding, suggesting that the government still has a dominant impact on Chinese listed firms. Table 3 presents the correlations between our province-level and firm-level variables.
The correlation between the two synchronicity measures, Ψ(1) and Ψ(2) is 0.976. Measures of synchronicity are negatively correlated with property rights (PropertyRights), rule of law (RuleofLaw), and political pluralism (PoliticalPluralism). A firm's stock price synchronicity is lower when they are located in a province in which there is sounder institutional development in term of property rights protection, rule of law, and political pluralism. The simple correlations are consistent with our three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3).
Regression results
Estimates of synchronicity model
To test for the effects on synchronicity of property rights (H1), of rule of law (H2), and of political pluralism (H3), we estimate the following equation:
where it  is the measure of stock synchronicity for firm i and year t. The institutional environment variables PropertyRights, RuleofLaw and PoliticalPluralism are our primary interests and we expect that β 1, β 2 and β 3 < 0. CONTROL denotes a set of control variables including the variables GovernmentOwn , ForeignOwn, BShare, HShare, Volume, Size, Leverage, EarningVolatility, MarketToBook, Log(IPOAge), IndustryByNumber, IndustryBySize, GDPGrowth, and Log(GDPPerCapita) . Finally, the regressions include fixed effects for the year (YearDummies) and industry (IndustryDummies).
Government related shareholders are more likely to be associated with expropriation risk and information asymmetry problems compared to foreign shareholders. Thus, we expect the coefficient on GovernmentOwn to be positive and the coefficient on ForeignOwn to be negative.
Since foreign investors are presumably more skilled at collecting and trading on firm-specific information, we expect that the variables BShare and HShare are negatively correlated with stock price synchronicity. We expect that the coefficient on Volume is negative because more trading will help incorporate more firm-specific information. We expect that the coefficient on the variable Size is positive because stocks of large firms are more likely to be aligned with the whole market. The coefficient on the variable Leverage is likely to be positive because the cost of collecting private information may be higher for the firms with greater risk of financial distress. We expect that the coefficient on EarningVolatility is negative because stocks of firms with higher earning uncertainty have more firm-specific variation. The coefficient of the variable
MarketToBook is expected to be negative because stocks of firms with higher growth potential will incorporate more firm-specific information. We expect that the coefficient on Log(IPOAge)
is positive because more of the time-invariant firm-specific information such as managerial quality is already incorporated in the stock price for older firms and firms-specific information that can be impounded in to the stock price is less available (Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao, 2009 ).
Estimates of Equation (3) The effect of these institutional factors on stock price synchronicity is not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. We use the results reported in the last column of Table 4 to assess the impact of the institutional variables on stock price synchronicity.
A one standard deviation increase in PropertyRights decreases stock price synchronicity (i.e. 
Alternative stock price synchronicity measures?
As mentioned above, the Chinese stock market has some unique features because there are both shares issued to domestic investors (A-shares) and two types of shares issued to foreign Table 5 are qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 4 and thus support our previous conclusions.
Is there a threshold effect?
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that the relationship between investor protection and stock price synchronicity is different in emerging markets as compared to developed countries.
To see if there are any similar threshold effects within China, we divide our sample into developing provinces with below median GDP per capita and developed provinces. To test whether our results hold within both sub samples or mainly describe differences between the groups, we estimate synchronicity regressions for sub samples as shown in Table 6 . The regressions are estimated for the high and low GDP per capita provinces separately. The coefficient estimates are qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 4 across these two sub samples, which thus support our previous conclusions and indicate that our results are not driven by the differences between the sub samples.
Alternative explanations
In this paper, we argue and show that the poor institutional development increase the cost of information collection and reduce investors' incentives to collect private information. This reduces the information content of stock prices and increases stock price synchronicity. To formally address these concerns, we add interaction terms between our institutional development variables and the state ownership variable to the synchronicity regressions. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) argue that the state owners are more likely to be related to inefficient corporate governance and provide less protection for minority shareholders. If, in fact, the higher investor protection provided by the better institutional environment decreases the cost of information collection and increases investors' incentives to collect private information, which contributes to the incorporation of information into stock prices of firms, we expect that the effect of institutional development on synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with higher government ownership and there is a negative coefficient on this interaction variable.
The results in Table 7 show that the interactions between government ownership and the variables PropertyRights and RuleofLaw are negative and significant. This is true when the interactions with the three institutional variables are considered individually or when we put all three variables and the interaction terms into the regression together (column (4) of Table 7 ).
That is the (negative) effect of institutional quality on synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with higher government ownership.
Next we test whether provincial institutional development has a more significant impact on synchronicity for firms with lower foreign ownership. To do so, we add interaction terms between our institutional development variables and the foreign ownership variable to the synchronicity regressions. Foreign shareholders are less likely to be associated with expropriation risk and information asymmetry problems (e.g., Kang and Stulz, 1997; Jiang and Kim, 2004) . If, in fact, the higher investor protection provided by the better institutional environment decreases the cost of information collection and increases investors' incentives to collect private information, which contributes to the incorporation of information into stock prices of firms, we expect find that the effect of institutional development on synchronicity is more pronounced for firms with lower foreign ownership and there is a positive coefficient on this interaction variable. The estimates shown in columns (5) to (8) of Table 8 show that the coefficients on the interactions between foreign ownership and the three institutional development variables are all positive and significant. This is true when the interactions with the three institutional variables are considered individually or when all three variables and the interaction terms are entered into the regression together in column (8) of Table 7 . That is increased foreign ownership decreases the size of the negative effect of institutional quality on synchronicity.
In summary, we find that better institutions have a more pronounced effect on stock price informativeness for firms with higher government ownership and lower foreign ownership.
These results suggest that the poor institutional development provides less investor protection.
This increases the cost of information collection and reduces investors' incentives to collect private information. This further reduces the information content of stock prices and increases stock price synchronicity.
Other robustness checks
In this section we preformed on several additional robustness tests that were preformed to give us confidence that the results already discussed are reliable. In the interest of space the results are not shown although they are available from the authors on request.
First, estimates of the market model are based on daily returns and a potential bias can be introduced by non-synchronous trading because some stocks do not trade every day (Scholes and Williams 1977; French, Schwert, and Stambaugh 1987) . In order to account for this, we also estimated the market models with lagged industry and market returns without any noticeable effect on the results. In addition, we estimated the market models with weekly rather than daily data which does not alter our results and conclusions, either.
Second, we varied the windows used to winsorize the data to 2 and 98 percentiles or 5 and 95 percentiles. Our results are still robust to such variation in the size of the data set.
Third, some variables such as Ruleoflaw have interpolated values for certain years. To ensure that interpolation of this variable does not affect our results, we use the firm-year observations without those interpolated values to estimate our synchronicity regression. We obtain similar results and the same conclusions.
Fourth, four large municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) are under much stronger control by the central government than the other provinces. Thus, we re-estimated the models without these four municipalities, and find that our results are robust.
Conclusions
China provides a unique opportunity to examine the influence different institutional environments regarding investor protection on stock price synchronicity in an area where other country-level characteristics are shared. Specifically, we investigate whether and how stock price synchronicity is associated with province-level institutional characteristics unique to China.
The province-level institutional variables we examine include property rights, rule of law, and political pluralism. Our panel study of 31 Chinese provinces for the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] suggests that the development of awareness of property rights, law enforcement, and political pluralism are associated with more stock price informativeness. We also find that better institutions have a more pronounced effect on stock price informativeness for firms with higher government ownership and lower foreign ownership.
Our evidence has some clear policy implications for emerging economies with high stock price synchronicity. We know from Wurgler (2000) and Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) among others that the efficiency of capital allocation and investment will be improved if stock prices incorporate more firm-specific information (i.e. synchronicity is reduced). And our results
show convincingly that institutional improvements are associated with reduced stock price synchronicity. Thus, our results show a clear channel by which improvements in the institutional environment are associated with improved economic outcomes.
Appendix Variable Definitions
The R 2 of the market model in equation (1). R
(2)
The R 2 of the market models in equation (2).
The number of trademark applications per firm in a province; proxy for the awareness of property rights.
RuleofLaw
The number of lawyers per 10,000 people in a province; proxy for rule of law.
PoliticalPluralism
The proportion of non-Communist party members in the provincial People's Congress relative to the proportion in the National People's Congress GovernmentOwn
The percentage of shares held by government owner(s) at year beginning ForeignOwn
The percentage of shares held by foreign owner(s) (Hong Kong, Taiwan, other countries) at year beginning Bshare An dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm issues B-shares and 0 otherwise
Hshare
An dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm issues H-shares and 0 otherwise Volume
The total number of shares traded in a year, scaled by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year Size
The logarithm of total assets Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets EarningVolatility
The standard deviation of a firm's ROAs over the preceding five-year period, including the current year MarketToBook Market value of assets over book value of assets. Market value of assets are measured as book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity Log(IPOAge)
The logarithm of the firm age since IPO IndustryByNumber
The logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs IndustryBySize
The logarithm of year-end total assets of all sample firms in the industry to which a firm belongs GDPGrowth Annual growth rate in per capita real GDP GDPPerCapita
The per capita GDP deflated to the base year of 1998 Log(GDPPerCapita) The logarithm of per capita GDP deflated to the base year of 1998 
Figure 1 Stock Price Synchronicity by Year
This figure plots the average stock price synchronicity of Chinese listed firms measured by R 2 (1)
